The term "neoliberalism" is encountered everywhere today. In popular leftist political rhetoric it is often simply a place-holder for "contemporary capitalism", "austerity politics", and "all that is bad in our world", giving that rhetoric the appearance of a new diagnostic edge. However, one could be excused for thinking that its intelligibility is in inverse proportion to its ubiquity. By defining it in terms of its conceptual relationship with classical liberalism this paper offers a justification for thinking about our time as period in which a particular "community of ideas" has sought (with some success) to establish a neoliberal hegemony. Doing so reveals, however, that there are in fact a variety of neoliberalisms, and that the period we now inhabit is best conceived in terms of the rise of a distinctively economic variation. Europe's history is sketched (anachronistically) in terms of shifting patterns and transitions in which neoliberal variants vie for power. Setting those transitions within a wide-angled vision of Europe's modernity as inseparable from a movement of the decentring of our understanding of "man", the chance for a new shift is identified -one to be accompanied, no doubt, by "a surge of laughter" that has been heard, regularly and without fail, throughout the entirety of Europe's history.
Varieties of Neoliberalism
The Copernican Earth is no longer at the centre of the universe, and this is more and more the case one could say. Jacques Derrida
The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher. Ludwig Wittgenstein
Liberal Man
In a lecture delivered in Prague in 1935, the German philosopher Edmund
Husserl introduced a worry he felt regarding what he called "the total worldview of modern man" (Husserl 1970, p. 6) . That world-view was one that had, he thought, "turned away from the questions which are decisive for humanity" (Husserl 1970, p. 6) . These are "questions concerning the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of human existence" (Husserl 1970, p. 6) .
Blinded by the astonishing success of the natural sciences, "modern man" -which he will identify strongly with the culture of modern European humanity with its "birthplace" in ancient Greece -has become indifferent to what natural sciences are themselves indifferent to. As he put it, "merely factminded sciences make merely fact-minded people" (Husserl 1970, p.6 ).
Husserl made the following plea to his listeners in 1935 regarding the "decisive" questions:
Do not these questions demand universal reflections and answers based on rational insight? In the final analysis they concern man as a free, self-determining being. What does science have to say about reason and about us men as subjects of this freedom? The mere science of bodies clearly has nothing to say; it abstracts from everything subjective. As for the humanistic sciences, on the other hand, we are told that the scholar carefully excludes all evaluative positions.
Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing how the world is in fact. But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment? (Husserl 1970, pp. 6-7) This is a wonderfully rich passage, beautifully summarising a sense of the contemporary predicament of modern Europe: of European humanity in the times of science finding itself paradoxically but increasingly resistant to any substantive philosophy of history in terms of which "historical occurrence", especially its own, is the very opposite of an "unending concatentation of illusory progress". We could explore all of its corners and cornerstones. But I want for the moment to pick up on just one of its most clear, open, and ultimately most problematic assumptions: namely, its conception of "man" -the conception of the being that "we men" ourselves are -as essentially "a free, self-determining being", the conception of man, and hence of ourselves, as rational subjectivity (Husserl 1970, p. 290) .
This conception of human life is not one among others. Indeed, it is the conception that informs the very sciences that so obsess modern European humanity. Man pursues science, and can grasp the objective truth about the world when he does so. And the reason why man can do this is fundamentally related to reason itself, to the possibility of freely determining himself to achieve a rationally grounded and disinterested cognition of the world and genuine knowledge of the facts.
The great masters of the philosophical tradition from Plato to Descartes to Kant and beyond, all subscribe to something like this view of man, of the pure humanity of man, as rational subjectivity. I am going to come back to Plato shortly, to an incredible moment in an incredible philosophical text, a text which (incredibly) helped decisively to shape the whole intellectual culture of Europe. But first, I want to note, with Husserl, that none of these great thinkers supposed that the only form of rational inquiry worthy of man was the exercise of theoretical reason (the pursuit of science). On the contrary, the classic view would be that there are various forms of rational activity, and not all of them aim at empirical knowledge of facts. Here is a selection of candidate interests of reason, all of which those who cleave to a conception of man as rational subjectivity might regard as (at least sometimes) worthy of man to pursue. I will describe them as varieties of rational cognition, but the point here is not to presume that they all aim at knowledge of facts. I simply mean that the proper appreciation of their "objects" that they aim to achieve in this or that domain are all taken to require the exercise of reason, and hence are, for this tradition, one and all regarded as distinctively human cognitive interests.
Theoretical reason -rational cognition of the world leading to empirical knowledge.
Practical reason -rational cognition of right action leading in the ethical sphere to moral knowledge and in the commercial sphere to economic knowledge.
Aesthetic judgement -rational cognition of the beautiful and the sublime leading to aesthetic knowledge.
Religious faith -rational cognition of the supersensory leading to knowledge of God.
Pure reason -rational cognition of rational cognition leading to wisdom (philo-sophia) Let us suppose (concesso non dato) that "the pure humanity of man" is, indeed, in the final analysis, as Husserl puts it, that of "a free, self-determining being". If this were true, what would be the optimal conditions of human flourishing? What would be those conditions in which what is here called "man" can most fully realise his being as a free, self-determining being, as rational subjectivity? What are the conditions for the emancipation of rational subjectivity? And are these questions capable of being given "answers based on rational insight" as Husserl supposes?
Although I do not really think it is restricted to political liberalism, for reasons that will emerge, I am going to construe what I will call classical liberal thought as offering a positive answer to this question. The classical liberal response to Husserl's worries that I am envisaging passes through three steps. The first six are domains that are usually regarded as part of the public sphere; the last is the private sphere. Classical liberal thought has been, we should note, distinctively gendered with respect to the analysis of rational subjectivity it offers. Women's "proper" interests are supposed to belong almost exclusively to the private sphere.
Second step: power should aim to organise the social world in such a way that each person's capacity freely to perform (if and where proper) in each of these domains is optimised. Historically, for women that has meant very little at all in anything but the private sphere. For men, however, there should be, within reason, and compatible with the scope for other men to do so too, as wide as possible opportunity for devoting oneself freely to whatever one especially wants to devote oneself to.
The ambition of liberal thought is thus to organise society in such a way that it can offer its citizens as great an opportunity as possible (and as appropriate) to pursue their rational interests. One can imagine the classical liberal seeing all sorts of conflicts, all sorts of trade-offs here: individual efforts to strike a balance between incommensurable ambitions and desires, and the sacrifices one might have to make in pursuit of one's chosen interests. Husserl's remarks about the world-view of modern European man suggest that what I am calling the classical liberal view is in crisis. Suddenly the movement of our history seems not to be taking the path we thought we were on. History seems no longer a sequence of increasingly congenial spiritual worlds but a random series of worlds that "form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves".
Neoliberal Hegemonies
What has gone wrong? What is to be done? I said I would go back to Plato. I am not going to say just yet what he proposed as the way to get us on track.
But I do want to preface everything I am going to say here with the words that prefaced his own account of what is to be done. In the course of his discussion of an ideal form of society, Plato claims that there is a fault to all the forms of society that have ever actually existed that prevents them from running as they should -prevents them running, that is to say, in anything like the way the ideal state would run. But Plato also thought that there was a way of putting things right, and very surprisingly, he supposed there was just one thing needful. Here is Plato, speaking through Socrates, in conversation with Glaucon and Adeimantus (Plato's elder brothers):
"I think we can show that the transformation can be effected by a single change," I said, "but it's hardly a small or easy one, though it is possible."
"Tell us what it is." "I'm now facing what we call the biggest wave," I replied. "I'll tell you what it is, even if it swamps me in a surge of laughter and I'm drowned in contempt." (Plato 1974, 473c, p. 262) The laughter and contempt has not gone away. And I imagine it will return in another wave when the reader reaches the conclusion of this text too. So be it.
To introduce the Platonic cause of the wave of laughter, first recall the Husserlian anxiety with the waves of failure. Husserl's paradoxical suggestion is that a new doubt about progress in human history arises in the wake of the undeniable progress in what should be humanity's greatest achievement: in the European sciences of nature. I will be affirming a variation of that thought in this essay but it is a variation that conceives Husserl's own position as part of the problem. Husserl cleaves to the thought that philosophy too should aim to be a science of some (very special) sort:
namely, a science of the transcendental ideality of the essence of everything empirically objective. While the kind of knowledge in view here (a radical form of self-knowledge) has a modern form (taking its point of departure from the thinking subject, the ego cogito), Husserl's account of ideal essences as the (non-spatio-temporal or irreal) "objects" of some sort of "intuition" displays a cognitivism about philosophy's results that has been a mainstay of philosophy since Greek antiquity, and has a fundamental source in Platonism.
ii I will want to refer Husserl's worries to an understandable anxiety that arises when such cognitivism is no longer something we can seriously entertain. However, I won't take that to negate his general conception of the formation of modern Europe's societies; the conception of a form of communalisation that is fundamentally shaped by the emergence of philosophy in Greek antiquity. And it is to Plato that I want to turn first for an explanation of why it may be that "all the shapes of the spiritual world" we have witnessed hitherto might seem to amount to no more than "fleeting waves".
Plato compares governance in states with captaincy on ships:
Suppose the following to be the state of affairs on board a ship or ships.
The captain is larger and stronger than any of the crew, but a bit deaf and short-sighted, and similarly limited in seamanship. The crew are all quarrelling with each other about how to navigate the ship, each thinking he ought to be at the helm… They spend all their time milling round the captain and doing all they can to get him to give them the helm. If one faction is more successful than another, their rivals may kill them and throw them overboard, lay out the honest captain with drugs or drink or in some other way take control of the ship…. (Plato 1974, 488b, p. 282, emphasis mine.) In the spirit of this description, I want to propose the following hypothesis.
The history of efforts to realise the classical liberal conception of human flourishing -efforts to achieve the emancipation of rational subjectivityhave been subject to more than one neoliberal usurpation or coup by some faction or (as I will put it) community of ideas that wants to achieve hegemony.
The thought here is that, like the factions attempting to seize control of the ship, efforts to optimise opportunities for leading a life proper to rational subjectivity have given rise to movements that attempt to achieve the hegemonic domination of the norms that belong to only one of the domains of rational life. Those who belong to the community of ideas that represent or defend the interests of just one of the domains of life attempt to take charge of the whole; they attempt to "take control of the ship", they want to seize power, become hegemonic, and thence, for as long as they hold the reins of power, displace and subordinate the interests of every other domain to their own interests.
Plato's ship seems occasionally to be overwhelmed by its factions. On the story I am telling, that achievement is really very rare. Mostly we have been ruled by the "deaf and short-sighted" who are "limited in seamanship".
I define neoliberalism in general, then, as the outlook of a community of ideas that seeks the limitless extension of the norms of conduct of one domain of life to the whole of life. Its emancipatory claim is that it will achieve the optimal flourishing of the whole of life by co-ordinating and controlling it in terms dictated by the norms of that one domain. The guiding assumption of every neoliberal community of ideas is that human flourishing in life in general requires that one particular domain of life -the interests of one particular community of ideas -should rule. It is important to distinguish this kind of economic neoliberalism from, for example, policy preferences for the privatisation of previously statecontrolled sectors of an economy. That aspiration is compatible with classical liberalism, which would accept that certain kinds of activity might flourish most successfully if they are subject to the rigours of "market disciplines"; of competition, of profitability, and so on. The classical liberal would not think, however, that every domain of life should likewise be governed by these norms (cultivation of fairness among friends, love, beauty, wisdom, etc have other, incommensurable, norms). The defining feature of the community of ideas that seeks the hegemony of economic neoliberalism is not a demand that any and every entity be held in private hands but that there is no domain of life that is not appropriately subject to the rule of market-oriented reasoning.
To give an example that will prove not to be one example among others, consider the university. Not every classical liberal will have principled objections to the idea of a private university, and some might even have a preference for that. But the classical liberal will not think that what is called "success in academic inquiry" should itself be conceived and measured in the terms appropriate to a business model, nor would such a liberal regard the activity of a university as something to be measured exclusively by its contribution to economic interests outside it. The economic neoliberal disagrees on both fronts: academics deliver products to consumers and those products can be assessed in the same way we assess any product or commodity: in terms of satisfying consumer preferences. Moreover, the university as a part of wider society should also be judged in terms of its service to national (or more generally commercial) economic goals and interests. A classical liberal might object that while running a university on business lines is fine, the best way of doing so, the best way of delivering the most competitive institution, is, as far as possible, to free a space of "play" within the general economy that maximises the opportunity for rational inquiry to be unfettered by anything, whether immediate student satisfaction, rapid external impact or exploitable commercial relevance. v I'll come back to this.
However, there is a feature of our time that Husserl remarks on in the passage I began with that fundamentally interrupts this a-historical conceptual contrast between classical liberalism and economic neoliberalism, and it is a feature that can make one feel altogether despairing: namely, the absence in our time (unless we are Marxists) of the kind of substantive "philosophy of history" through which the classical liberal conception, in its third step, had understood our lives. We live in a time which, whether temporarily or permanently we do not know, has more or less abandoned such grand historical narratives of world history. The idea of the history of the world as the emancipation and progress of rational subjectivity is (I will claim) simply no longer credible (no more than the idea of world history as leading towards the emancipation of the working subject qua universal subject).
In such a time -in a time when (believe me) we have become increasingly resistant to such teleological meta-narratives -the only game in town for decision makers within the social world is to make attempts at making "the system" function without undue problems; of improving the "efficiency" of institutions, of seeking the "optimization of the system" -with no higher end but improving its functioning (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv) . In other words, into the space left open by the falling away of classic discourses of emancipation and progress, the community of ideas that champions economic neoliberalism and its market criteria of efficiency and performativity have been able to occupy the field virtually unchallenged. With regard to those who get caught up in any neoliberal seizure of power, the imperative is simple: "be operational (that is, be commensurable [with the norms of the hegemonic domain]) or disappear" (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv) . With economic neoliberalism there is a "level of terror" associated with this hegemony that is very often, as JeanFrançois Lyotard says, "hard", utterly unforgiving (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv) .
And, as Husserl anticipates, it all seems despairingly hopeless, making our existence fundamentally pointless, tragically meaningless.
It doesn't look good. But the situation only seems one of existential "crisis" if, with Husserl, you think that the only way our lives could be regarded as meaningful is against the background of the thought that world history follows a teleological or teleo-eschatological path, program or design (whether of God, nature or man). Husserl thinks we cannot find consolation in anything short of such a background. How can the history of the entelechy of rational subjectivity be other than teleological? Indeed, how can it. So perhaps it is not the history of rational subjectivity…
In the face of this new situation, if we are to learn to see it as something other than the total disaster for European societies today that Husserl worries about, we need to learn two things. First, (pace classical liberalism in its third step) we need to learn to see that the idea of living a worthwhile life -what Husserl calls a meaningful existence -really does not depend on the truth of a teleological philosophy of world history. And second, (pace economic neoliberalism in its first step) we need to learn to see that the form of social life which Husserl so clearly, and in my view rightly, wants to protect and defend -namely, (and here we see the point of the university example) one which is cultivated or irrigated by and in turn cultivates what he calls "a community of purely ideal interests" (Husserl 1970, p. 287) , what Jacques Derrida calls (keeping the old name for strategic purposes) "the university without condition" (Derrida 2002, p. 202) -cannot be sustained, or has no chance, in conditions of the limitless extension of economic reason, the logic of the market.
In our time, what one might call the historical task for European societies may appear modest. Instead of striking out towards a final end of history, the task as I see it is to protect and defend a form of communalization hitherto most strongly (but not by any means exclusively) linked to the history of European universities, the development of which is inseparable from what Immanuel Kant claimed to be the distinctive European cultural achievement: the formation of an "educated public which has existed uninterruptedly from its origin [in classical antiquity] to our times" (Kant 1970, p. 52) . This is a form of communalization that, as Husserl puts it, "spreads out from philosophy" (Husserl 1970, p. 286) . In other words, and it can now be seen this is not such a modest proposal, the task is one in which the community of ideas (supposing for a moment that it is one) that has classically championed the unfettered inquiry after truth -the community, that is to say, of those we call "philosophers" and its distinctive will to truth -sustains within society, and as dissidents in an era of economic neoliberalism, a certain will to power.
Unless we are Marxists
What I want to represent as the opposite of the kind of culture that this aspires to is the one found in apocalyptic texts such as Brave New World and 1984.
Here the idea is so to arrange things that the main forms of selfunderstanding available are of a sort that conditions people to want to be "operational" in a life that is, as it were, essentially hostile to the will to truth.
On this view, to keep the system performing you only need to ensure that enough people think they are living worthwhile lives, and so are more or less happily operational creatures of the ruling hegemonic order. They think they are living worthwhile lives, but really they are not. They are alienated by the system -but they think they are not.
Some theorists of Europe's contemporary condition encourage us to think that our situation is already rather like this. For example, some see in Foucault's ideas of "governmentality" (Foucault 2007 ) something very like the vision of life imagined in 1984. And Marxism has long held the view that our appreciation of our condition is systematically distorted. Here, from the Marxist thinker Alex Callinicos, is one way of making this point:
To diagnose alienation is to draw a contrast between the present situation, where the subject may be misled by appearances into failing to recognise her loss, and a counterfactual condition of authenticity, where she has all the powers proper to her. (Callinicos 2006, p. 4) At least part of the problem with this kind of diagnosis is that it depends on having or claiming to have at our disposal now a viewpoint that is in principle immune from the allure of such present appearances, and which others now frankly and sadly lack. The worry is not that you need exclusively to inhabit such a viewpoint but that some people, unlike most of us in this condition, are nevertheless sometimes able to do so. And, as the sketch from Callinicos suggests, this seems to require that one has at one's disposal a conception and In our time -and this is what really worries Husserl too -we no longer find it compelling, indeed we seem profoundly to resist, conceiving issues concerning the worth of our lives in terms of a contrast between a final or objective truth of man, a truth which the well-adjusted mind manages, despite alluring appearances, to adjust itself to, and various kinds of deluded conceptions which are the upshot of being misled by the shadow play of appearances. On the other hand, as we shall see, the idea of a contrast between the meaningful and the meaningless life, a contrast that Callinicos (with Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, et. al.) implicitly insists on, is something I will not want to give up on at all. Moreover, we can be encouraged in this by noting that a concern with this kind of contrast is not in the least restricted to an epistemically privileged minority. On the contrary, it seems to me that even today the number of willing "victims of the system", those who might be thought of as "misled by appearances into failing to recognise [their] loss", is shrinkingly small. For example, it is encouraging how few people actually seem to want a society everywhere framed by the norms of economic neoliberalism: in contrast to a conception of a life that most of us are already quite capable of imagining, it is hard to find anyone who thinks the current neoliberal hegemony is likely to realise it. vii So we certainly need to retain that idea of a contrast. But we should abandon the idea of an epistemically privileged viewpoint doing so. We need to accept that among the conditions under which people can be said actually to be living anything short of a worthwhile life are conditions in which people actually think they are. (Values are like secondary qualities in that respect.) Myths of governmentality and radical alienation encourage the idea that the social world we inhabit creates conditions in which people can think they are living worthwhile lives when really they are not, and hence that the reforms or revolutions that would be needed are at once virtually wholesale, and (given people's thoughts on the subject) depressingly unrealisable. But, first, (if values are like secondary qualities) it is not clear to me that the premise of such radical alienation makes any sense, nor, second, does it seem to be true that we really are so fully duped by the system. For reasons that should now be becoming much clearer, I want to illustrate this second point once more with the university example (although, again, not one example among others). Here is an attestation from a participant of some unremarkable -but really important -truths about the limits of economic neoliberalism with respect to the temporality of intellectual achievement:
Higher education is not about results in the next quarter but about discoveries that may take -and last -decades or even centuries.
Neither the abiding questions of humanistic inquiry nor the winding path of scientific research that leads ultimately to innovation and discovery can be neatly fitted within a predictable budget and timetable. (Faust, 2009) Values related to such economic-incalculables really do struggle to be heard under an increasingly economic neoliberal hegemony, but that does not mean that participants are typically "misled by appearances" into failing to recognise them. It is hard to imagine that anyone who is not benefiting personally from the formation of "executive teams" in university administrations could feel remotely close to the language in the document, from King's College London in 2010, which explained that the institution must "create financially viable academic activity by disinvesting from areas that are at sub-critical level with no realistic prospect of extra investment". This is truly, madly, and deeply stupid. viii And in the end that is always going to be the kind of reason why we should decisively resist those who belong to the community of ideas that promotes the economic neoliberal hegemony. It is why we do.
On the other hand, I would not reject it here as the Vice of Capitalism (if there is such a thing as Capitalism, or such a thing as Capitalism as such, which I doubt; we know today better than before that, insofar as we can speak of it, there are Varieties of Capitalism, with a variety of Vices and Virtues). Of far greater significance, I think, is that in a time of incredulity towards the great historical narratives of emancipation and progress, we understandably struggle in these conditions coherently to articulate our (continuing) interest in emancipation and progress themselves. And in a situation in which the community of ideas that calls for the functional "optimization of the system" and its ever greater "efficiency" in terms of economic norms holds so much of the field, prospects for those classic interests can seem bleak indeed.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that the "performativity" criterion has to be dominated by a neo-liberal community of ideas. The "level of terror" endured by those expected to be operational is not bound to be "hard", and beyond reform. Indeed, "the performativity of the system" itself has no chance at all if its continued functioning is constantly threatened by dissatisfaction, demoralisation and resentment. And yet this still sounds immensely depressing. I mean, what's the point of all this "functioning"?
We have for a long time supposed that it is the progressive movement of our forms of social life towards distant ideals that alone gives meaning to our lives. But one does not have to have such a teleological vision in view to affirm that the future matters to us: one can simply want to make it so that what one does, individually and collectively, here and now will have been some kind of a progressive preface to what remains to come, without any such vision of a final end. Elsewhere in the same essay cited a moment ago, Wiggins recalls that part of the unease that many feel about factory farming, intensive livestock rearing, the general spoliation of nature, and the extinction of innumerable animal species is that it shows us modern men and women, as in a mirror, as at certain points akin to a form of life we might well think "profoundly alien": akin, that is, to an animal with "no non-instrumental concerns and no interest in the world considered as lasting longer than the animal in question will need the world to last in order to sustain the animal's own life" (Wiggins 1987 (Wiggins , p. 1124 . Such a life is no preface to what remains to come at all, and "functioning" to such a destructive end is not just depressing but runs totally against the grain of a participant's sense of the temporal "here and now" of a human life as one in which "the dead and the unborn are also present" (Scruton 2012, p. 234) . The time of our lives is one which "connects us to worlds before and after us" (Scruton 2012, 234) . Our lives, our sense of who we are, is conceived out of and within that temporal stretch.
"Functioning to no end" might describe the infrastructure of a presently operational life-support system, but not the horizon of a human life worth living; the milieu of our "spiritual worlds" -the "locus of our cares and endeavours" (Husserl, 1970, p. 272 ) -is a "present" that should be fundamentally linked to those who are not there. (Husserl 1970, p. 286) , an enculturation tied to the "ancient canons" that Kant has in view in his description of modern Europe's "uninterrupted" classical heritage. Tied to those canons -but not "bound to the soil" of any specific region or locale (Husserl 1970, p. 286) . It is a European cultural (spiritual) milieu, then, without radical attachment to any specific geographical milieu, European or otherwise.
We inherit these "ancient canons". But it is not something to inherit without more ado. Indeed, it is also the heritage of the anthropocentric, androcentric and Eurocentric conception of the meaning of human life and history -the conception of man -that today we are more resistant to than the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries knew how to be. And yet, for reasons I will return to, I am at one with Derrida in affirming that these "ancient canons…ought to be protected at any price" (Derrida, 2002, p. 208, my emphasis) . The basic claim of the philosopher, then, is that it is the classical European culturesupranational in its essential tendency -"that radiates out from philosophy" (Husserl 1970, p. 286) , that radiates out from the community of ideas (if it is one) committed to unfettered inquiry after truth, it is that will to truth, which must, today more than ever, assert its will to power. Hahahahaha…
We know that the hegemony of economic neoliberalism will not do. However, I want to add immediately, that things will not be helped if power is seized instead by those who belong to the community of ideas that seeks the hegemony of political neoliberalism -the limitless extension of the political to every sphere of life. Here the force jostling for hegemonic power is not the one that calls for the maximisation of utility, but the one that calls for the maximisation of equality. While it seems to be on a distinctly more gilded path than its economic neoliberal cousin, with respect to becoming operational within its hegemony, political neoliberalism is, if anything, worse. I will explain.
The Varieties of Neoliberalism
In the course of a remarkable history, part of the post-War settlement in Europe -part of the slow turn towards the current economic neoliberal form of "optimization of the system" -has been the emergence of an increasingly professional, managerial, and technocratic political class, and a correspondingly dramatic falling away of political participation by the citizenry. This has led many to call for a re-politicisation of society in a more or less traditional sense: the mobilisation of a citizenry who actively, selfconsciously and especially directly participate in projects aiming at the realisation of greater social and economic equality. This desire for traditional re-politicisation in a time of economic neoliberal hegemony is totally understandable and not in itself unwelcome -but insofar as it seeks social hegemony for political reason it remains nonetheless, in my view, wrong and misguided.
In the last three-hundred years, European humanity has experienced a fundamental changeover in its default understanding of the world and the significance of our lives: from a primarily religiously construed default (God and God's plan for man), to one which is not religiously construed (man's plan for man). Although they do not fully or simply hold the field in these periods, each is characterised by the significant presence and activism of two communities of ideas, two distinctively teleo-eschatological visions of a neoliberal hegemony: a radical religious neoliberal faction in the Middle-Ages prior to the Enlightenment, followed by factions that desire a political neoliberal hegemony in the wake of the general movement of democratisation which flows out of the French Revolution. The first supposes that every problem has (or ought to have finally) a religious solution. The second supposes that every problem has (or ought to have finally) a political one.
And we have here the germ of the political neoliberal ideal of a society in which a completed political hegemony will have finally transformed social conditions so as finally to realise the good life (on earth). Europe's political history is inseparable from the growth of this idea. For when all have learned to administer and actually do independently administer social production, independently keep accounts and exercise control over the parasites, the sons of the wealthy, the swindlers and other "guardians of capitalist traditions", the escape from this popular accounting and control will inevitably become so incredibly difficult, such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers are practical men and not sentimental intellectuals, and they scarcely allow anyone to trifle with them), that the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of the community will very soon become a habit. (Lenin 2009, pp. 107-8) The transition to a communist society takes place, Lenin suggests, through the process he thinks of as completing the democratisation of the state. This is a transition which brings the need for democratic government -an electorally approved political or ruling class -to an end. The end (telos) of democracy is thus the end (terminus) of democracy as a state system or regime of representative government: it is a condition in which all the members of society completely take over the work of adminstration for themselves. At the same time that political struggle disappears, society would, as it were, have become political through and through, one is a citizen in every dimension of one's being. And if you do not play the game, if you are not operational, you are an enemy of the people and you must disappear: your failure to conform to the norms in force will "be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment" that for most people it will, understandably enough, "become a habit" to conform. A miserable habit.
The mobilisation of identitarian affects in the name of equality is the aim of those who belong to the community of ideas that seeks hegemonic power in political neoliberalism. It was the aim of both national and international socialism: the aim is for every properly German citizen or for every properly communist comrade to want to be political through and through, a citizen at every moment, a comrade to the end, etc. It is the ambition to forge a community that really is one because it has become a community that really is The Platonist conception was, as I have indicated, problematically cognitivist. It implies that the ruler possesses peculiar and distinctive knowledge of the essence of everything empirically actual, every domain of life, and hence is best placed to rule over the whole of life in an ideally just way. A novel form of this cognitivism survives in Husserl's subjectivised transcendental phenomenology too, which he had hoped would effect "a complete reorientation of view" for man (Husserl 1970, p. 18) in terms of his "teleological sense" (Husserl 1970, p. 269) . But the history of the movement Husserl founded, as well as the wider history of philosophy in the last hundred years or so, has witnessed a marked acceleration in what one might call a "deconstructive" turn which exposes and turns away from philosophy's Platonist cognitivism (turns away from its ontology of an "ideal logos" of "pure idealities" (Nietzsche, 1973, p. 112) .
Homo Philosophicus. Philosophical Neoliberalism -the limitless extension of "philosophical reason" to every sphere of life -the aim: to maximise justice.
The idea of the philosopher as ruler recurs throughout the history of Europe in different guises, but always with the biggest wave of laughter and hence always remaining ahead of us as merely (perhaps only barely and perhaps even not really) "possible". "Possible", as Plato says, merely in the sense that we can approximate it. As an ideal, impossible, beyond practical, we admit it.
But: the impossible as "possible", we still say. Not "a small change nor easy", says Plato. So it seems it will not be coming anytime soon, not tomorrow, and not the day after either. But do we even know what such an event would be?
Do we know what the philosopher rulers to come will look like? For us, today, the idea is still like a joke, totally absurd. It remains a cause…of laughter.
The Pure Humanity of Man
What then might the philosopher today say this time, once more to save the name, to honour the name, of the philosopher king? Plato had his word on the idea of a condition in which justice was at one with power. But it depended on an idea of special kind of knowledge of the supersensible that "I philosopher" today am not willing to countersign. Instead, today, I will say this. This philosophical neoliberalism is fundamentally different to every other: the norms of the domain which would want to seize power in this case, the norms governing its will to truth, norms concerning what it is to inquire philosophically, are not given but remain in question. And in a culture run though with an openness to endless philosophical in-questioning, even the classical liberal idea of the given "domains of interest" loses its rigour. What it means to be "operational" in such a neoliberalism -the practical levels of terror -should be optimally minimised. The question of how to live is sustained not finally closed.
In a post-cognitivist world the philosopher's "knowing", ie what the philosopher specialises in, is no longer the attaining of a certain (special) kind of truth, but remains, as Nietzsche notes, inseparable from aiming at a certain (maximal) reach of responsibility (Nietzsche 1973, p. 124) : not just responsibility in this or that (supposed) domain of life (logic, politics, or art, for example) -not membership in this or that community of ideas xii -but responsible for the whole of life, and hence the meaning of our existence: "their 'knowing' is creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is -will to power" (Nietzsche 1973, p. 123) .
But what do I mean by our living in "a post-cognitivist world"? Let's go back to Wiggins for a moment, and add a little more to his conception of our time:
Unless we are Marxists, we are more resistant [today] than the eighteenth-or nineteenth-centuries knew how to be [to] attempts to locate the meaning of human life or human history in mystical or metaphysical conceptions -in the emancipation of mankind, or progress, or the onward advance of Absolute Spirit. It is not that we have lost interest in emancipation or progress themselves. But whether temporarily or permanently, we have more or less abandoned the idea that the importance of emancipation or progress (or a correct conception of spiritual advance) is that these are marks by which our minute speck in the universe can distinguish itself as the spiritual focus of the cosmos.
Wiggins specifies our time as "a time after Darwin" (Wiggins 1987, p. 91) .
However, his description of human decentring seems clearly to invoke our time also and (at least) equally as a time after Copernicus. And this recalls
Freud's discussion of the decentring "blows to narcissism" in the "times of science" (Freud 1963, pp. 284-5) : the Copernican blow, in which we can no longer conceive our planetary home as the centre of the cosmos; followed by the Darwinian blow, in which we can no longer conceive of our animal existence as inherently special or the centre of creation; followed, Freud thought, by his own blow delivered by psychoanalysis, in which we could no longer even regard ourselves as "master in our own house" (Freud 1993, p. "the Marxist blow" (Derrida 1994, pp. 97-8) . Not the blow affected by Marx with his non-theological, non-mystical, scientific and philosophical account of world history as the history of class struggles, but the blow struck by Marxism in the twentieth century. As Emmanuel Levinas put it, the greatest trauma for Europe in our time is not the work of an extraordinary scientific achievement, it is an event, a terrible event: "the end of socialism in the horror of Stalinism, is the greatest spiritual crisis in modern Europe…The noble hope The fact that this blow is not the work of a new scientific paradigm in some domain is of special significance. The other blows knock "man" off his pedestal in one way or another, and give us newly decentred ways of thinking (about our planet, about our evolution, about our motives) in their place. But in the event of the fourth blow (and with the others surging in again with it) the whole modern European conception of the meaning of man -the conception of man as progressing in a history of the emancipation of rational subjectivity from savage human animality to civilised rational society with Europe at the head -ceases to be a living or vital discourse on our being. With the advent of the nightmare of political neoliberalism -the terrifying failure of the ideal of a man-made programme designed (without God, without nature) for the complete emancipation of rational subjectivity and the "end of man" -the classic European conception of man finally loses credibility as a discourse through which we can understand the "who" that we are. In the face of the horror of Stalinism and Nazism (its inseparable adversary), the old European (hi)story of man and the history of man is exhausted, finished.
On the other hand, as Wiggins' declaration of a surviving commitment to emancipation and progress attests, this "end" is not a dead end. The demise of the old concept of man and the associated discourse of a movement of emancipation and progress towards a final "end of man" does not mean it is all over for us in our time, leaving us with nothing more than "functioning".
Derrida puts it like this:
In the same place, on the same limit, where history is finished, there where a certain determined concept of history comes to an end, precisely there the historicity of history begins, there finally it has the chance of heralding itself -of promising itself. There where man, a certain determined concept of man, is finished, there the pure humanity of man, of the other man and of man as other begins or has finally the chance of heralding itself -of promising itself. (Derrida 1994, p. 74) What is heralded by the end of the old European self-understanding is the chance and the promise of a new self-understanding to come. A selfunderstanding in which our "pure humanity" is no longer normed by the old prejudices which projected a superiority of European man over every other man, and which is no longer simply opposed to "mere animality" either. This then is the great task of those creators that Nietzsche called (forth) as the philosophers of the future: responsibility for the creation of a new selfunderstanding, a new meaning of human existence, beyond anthropocentrism, beyond androcentrism, and beyond Eurocentrism --beyond "man" in a time that is "more and more" a time after Copernicus. xiv But why "philosophers"? Precisely, as those most committed to the preservation and enhancement of the space within the body of our culture for what already belongs fundamentally to the formation of its body as a whole:
to keep the space open for the "intimate community" of those "bound together" by their unconditional commitment to the "critical stance [that] resolves not to accept unquestioningly any pregiven opinion or tradition" (Husserl 1970, p. 287) , where "nothing is beyond question" (Derrida 2002, p. 205) . This community -the community of those who do not belong to any particular community of ideas -responds to the call within the biggest wave of Europe's history: the call to engage in a renewed effort of "absolute self-responsibility" (Husserl 1970, p. 283) , where "it is a matter of nothing less than rethinking the concept of man" (Derrida 2002, p. 207) . This intimate, powerless, and yet still forceful community are the guardians of the heritage that gave life to Europe's old universities, and to the "community movement of education [Bildung] " those universities cultivated. Whether or not their future waves must or can or even should be situated "within the walls of what is today called the university" (Derrida 2002, p. 236 ) -that's another question.
Crisis", in Negotiations, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 70). Although it won't please those who want everything now, I am inclined at this point to affirm a variation of the thought expressed by Henry David Thoreau: that speaking practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-representative-government men and women, I ask for, not at once or soon no-representative-government, but at once and for the foreseeable future, better representative government. (See the opening three paragraphs of Thoreau's great text "On Civil Disobedience".) There is a lot to be done just there.
viii There have been many excellent discussions which pierce the shiny, powerful but ultimately profoundly fragile façade of economic sophistication in university management in the UK. See for example, Anthony Grafton in a 2010 NYRB blog "Britain:
The Disgrace of the Universities", from which the quotation from King's College is drawn. http://blogs.nybooks.com/post/437005501/britain-the-disgrace-of-theuniversities ix I explore this in detail in Glendinning, S (2014), "Settled-there: Heidegger on the work of art as the cultivation of place", Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology, Vol. 1, Issue 1.).
x This is a more complicated point than it looks. Europe's modern political history can be broadly conceived with a narrative of two narrative paths out of the French revolution: its mainstream history, which is primarily narrated in terms of the development of representative, parliamentary, and liberal democracy (occasionally fired and inspired by, but also typically almost ruined by revolutionary activists); and, alongside and inside that, revolutionary history, which is primarily narrated as a history of betrayals and failures (the results of which revolutionaries will see as unfolding in the development of parliamentary politics) in which efforts to shift to genuine workers power or the people's power are tragically thwarted. I think both sides of this narrative will recognise it (one way or the other). xiv I am picking up here on the remark by Jacques Derrida (in Specters of Marx, that heads this essay: "The Copernican Earth is no longer at the centre of the universe, and this is more and more the case one could say."
